Going Beyond Overlooked Populations in Lebanese Historiography: The Armenian Case by Nalbantian, T.
History Compass 11/10 (2013): 821–832, 10.1111/hic3.12092Going Beyond Overlooked Populations in Lebanese




Scholarship on the historiography of Lebanon consistently calls attention to ethnic and religious
communities that have been conveniently “left out” of Lebanese history to perpetuate either a mostly
Maronite imagination of Lebanon that traces its roots to Phoenician (and therefore non-Arab and
non-Muslim origins) or to a larger pan-Arab narrative. Nevertheless, recent attempts to write a
modified – and more inclusive – history of Lebanon continue to disregard Armenian inhabitants in
the country. By exploring the Lebanese Armenian press coverage of the 1946 Repatriation Movement
(a worldwide undertaking to gather all members of the Armenian Diaspora and relocate them in the
Soviet Republic of Armenia), I aim to show additional articulations of citizenship, homeland, and
belonging in Lebanon in the first years of its independence. Repatriation and its coverage present
us with untapped resources that complicate both traditional and corrective narratives of the history
of Lebanon. The exploration of these understandings allows for scholarship to go beyond the
traditional constraints of viewing Lebanon as an amalgamation of sectarian divisions that need to be
covered in some form to create a dominant national narrative. In addition, these findings avoid the
temptation to create a more inclusive national history of Lebanon, as they present scholars with
ambiguous and changing notions of who is Lebanese.
Abnormal and a Propensity for Violence
With a few notable exceptions, scholarship on Lebanese history tends to cast Lebanon as
an “abnormal” nation-state, as an unnatural entity.1 In a quest to show the dysfunctional
“nature” of Lebanon, many histories view Lebanon from within three prisms: war, sect,
and nationalism.2 These approaches become entry-points into understanding the current
schisms in Lebanese society. In attempting to provide a genealogy of civil disturbances
however, historians designate conflict as an innate characteristic of Lebanon, and its
presence justifies both their approach and subsequent scholarship.3
This constraint also shapes the approach of the works, as distinct historical actors and
events become compressed into a sequence of conflict between communities. And while
episodes of violence do indicate additional prisms that can be utilized to view Lebanon’s
history, such as nation, nationalism, and identification, there is an inevitable restriction
in their scope. Understanding Lebanon through this parameter prevents the inclusion
of histories that use additional and less common historical sources. The incorporation
of these sources circumvents the narrative of aggression, challenging the reading of
Lebanon as an abnormal nation-state. I argue that it is because historians of Lebanon
focus on its abnormality and connect this to its propensity for violence that Armenians
are seldom, if ever, represented in histories of Lebanon. When mentioned, Armenians
are thereafter immediately passed over in favor of other communities that better
illustrate Lebanon’s abnormality.© 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
822 Beyond Overlooked Populations in Lebanese HistoriographyIn critiquing the positioning of Lebanese historiography, I do not argue for or against
the “naturalness” or “unnaturalness” of Lebanon or of any other nation-state. My
departure from the extant scholarship entails a refutation of the notion that there exists
such a “natural” nation-state to which Lebanon can be contrasted and shown to be
exceptional. Abnormality explains the presence of violence and vice versa, thus
simultaneously excusing and ensuring the exclusion of Armenians, as they do not
reinforce either frame. Lack of evidence, rather than historical material, formulates many
historians’ questions.
Newcomers
Because Armenians have not been categorized as active players in the construction (or
destruction) of Lebanon, they are not included in its histories. When mentioned,
Armenians consistently are described as hailing from another location and experience,
as “originally” refugees from the Ottoman Empire. This other origin allots Armenians
in Lebanon to a different national space, and therefore, another history. The mainte-
nance of Armenians as a non-engaged presence in Lebanon begins from their treatment
as newcomers who owe their entry to French colonial practices.4
While Lebanon’s sectarian system constructed Armenians into a religious and sectarian
community (like other inhabitants of Lebanon), historians fail to consider whether
Armenian inhabitants played a role in the construction and maintenance of Lebanese
national identity and in the making of modern Lebanon. This is a marked difference
from recent studies that I will profile later in this study that attempt to insert minority
stories, such as the role of the Shi’i or the Druze, into the larger narrative of Lebanon.
These newer histories, which challenge long privileged Maronite or Sunni Arab
positionings of power in Lebanon, delve into the origins of the Shi’i and Druze
communities to historicize their construction as Lebanese political identities and to
locate them specifically as part of Lebanon.
A Redrawing of the National?
It is important to clarify that I am neither advocating for a mere “inclusion” of the
Armenian community within Lebanese history, nor for matching attention for Armenian
inhabitants as allotted to others. This indeed may be the first step that arises in such a
proposal, but I argue against the need for a more “complete” history. I contend that
the 1946–1949 Armenian repatriation movement, which was an organized attempt to
move the worldwide population of Armenians to Soviet Armenia, informs the formation
of Lebanese history. This reexamination contributes to scholarship of marginals in
society, rather than promoting an Armenian nationalist “correction” of Lebanese history.
Yet, the question remains, what might be gained by examining Armenian relationships,
networks, and actions – both internal to the community and connecting the Armenian to
non-Armenian communities – as part of Lebanon’s history?
I address this question in two ways. First, I begin by illustrating how Armenian (non)
involvement is forwarded by historiographers of Armenians and of Lebanon (in English,
Arabic, and Armenian), and I analyze the similar representations these historiographies
construct in turn. Second, I re-investigate the summer months of 1946 integrating
unnoticed events and actors in order to demonstrate how the inclusion of scholarship
on Armenians in Lebanon can deepen our understandings of Lebanon, Armenians,
and marginality. By looking at the voluntary population transfer of Armenians from
Lebanon during 1946–1949, we discover flexibility in identification, ideas of belonging,© 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd History Compass 11/10 (2013): 821–832, 10.1111/hic3.12092
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contemporary categorizations as the nation-state and citizenship while examining
additional understandings of the relationship between the loci of the nation and the
nation-state.
Qualifying Historiography
1946 is a pivotal time in Lebanese political and social history for four reasons. First, it is
the year that the last French mandatory forces leave Lebanon, paving the way for
Lebanese independence. Second, following the French departure, the sectarian political
categorizations they introduced became codified by the independent Lebanese state.
Third, 1946 also marks the year when the country’s inhabitants were made into
Lebanese citizens of the Republic of Lebanon, superseding their status as citizens of a
French Mandate. The fourth and final reason why I begin from 1946 is because this
was the year of the first Armenian “repatriation” caravan that sailed from Qarantina to
the USSR, bringing with it 2000 freshly minted Soviet citizens, or ex-Lebanese ones.
Armenians in Lebanon within Lebanese Historiography
By looking at a sample of Lebanese histories in English and Arabic, I show how histories
of Lebanon have represented the (non)involvement of Armenians. In their project to
construct Lebanon as a nation-state “destined” to fail, these works consider only the
inhabitants of Lebanon who have either directly participated in the creation or
attempted destruction of the state.
A House of Many Mansions: The History of Lebanon Reconsidered by Kamal Salibi and A
History of Modern Lebanon by Fawaz Traboulsi are two books widely cited as benchmarks
of contemporary histories of Lebanon.6
Salibi intermittently mentioned Armenians five times in his work.7 None of these
offered any substantial discussion of Armenians, suggesting they did not comprise of
one of its “many mansions” nor did they play a remarkable role within the “house”
of Lebanon. Salibi siphoned the Druze, Sunni, Shi’i, Maronite, Greek Orthodox and
Greek Catholic inhabitants of Lebanon through two religious categories: Christian and
Muslim. Most notably, he did not include Armenians, although most would self-identify
and externally be identified as Christian. After all, Armenians were granted citizenship in
1924 by the French to bolster the Christian populace. This distinction, along with the
disclaimer that Armenians did not share Arabic as a “common language” or “an Arab
way of life,” separated Armenian from the [other] Lebanese, and created a hierarchy
of belonging.8
While Salibi acknowledged the presence of Armenians but did not incorporate them into
his history of Lebanon, Fawaz Traboulsi ignored the Armenians completely.9 There was not
a single mention of Armenians in A History of Modern Lebanon, despite Traboulsi’s assertion
that his work filled a lacuna in the historiography of Lebanon. He wrote in the preface:
“An updated history of modern Lebanon is long overdue as the last such attempt dates from
the mid-1960s” and added, “while much has happened since a lot of new historical material
has been uncovered and researched.”10 Apparently none of the new material merited any
reference to Armenians. This, even though the departure of Armenians in 1946 affected
Lebanon’s demography and changed the composition of Lebanon’s towns and cities.
Like their English counterparts, Arabic histories of Lebanon either maintain a
universal Armenian experience in Lebanon or ignore the population completely.11
Maronite histories emphasize the distinctive Phoenician origins of the country while© 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd History Compass 11/10 (2013): 821–832, 10.1111/hic3.12092
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Likewise, many authors with Pan-Arab affinities, such as Amin Abu Izz al-Din and
Suleyman Taqi al-Din, emphasize the “Arab” texture of Lebanon, homogenizing
distinct narratives.13 This approach necessarily classifies Armenians as non-Lebanese and
justifies the author’s subsequent circumvention.14 Recent critical histories (written in En-
glish, but analyzing Arabic and French sources) that examine how Maronite history writing
aids in the construction of Maronite nationalist ideology in Lebanon, still fail to account for
any Armenian involvement in potentially enforcing or challenging such imaginations.15
Tamara Chalabi, Yusri Hazran, and MaxWeiss have produced works that diversify traditional
representations of Lebanese history.16 Their works encompass the experiences of the Druze and
the Shi’i populations of Jabal ’Amil, providing rich insight into processes of the codification of
identity through the study of court records and the Arabic press. However, one key connection
runs through both earlier and more recent traditional and contemporary emendations: all
accounts concur that the Shi’i and the Druze populations were part of the larger composition
of Lebanon. Though earlier histories tended to overlook the significance of the cultural records
of the Shi’i and the Druze, they never questioned their belonging as Lebanese, or their
participation in the history of Lebanon.17
Temporal notions of belonging and the consistent posturing of the origins of the
Armenian community in Lebanon outside of Lebanon expose a defense of nation-state
nationalism. Crudely put, recent histories of the Shi’i and the Druze claim these
populations should be included within Lebanese historiography because they are
Lebanese. What of communities who are more recently connected to the geographic
boundaries of the country or who may not wish to be considered Lebanese? Are they
simply (and justifiably) left out? This modification continues to ignore its Armenian
inhabitants and their role in the construction of Lebanon’s development.18 The
Armenian absence in Lebanese histories prevents us from fully engaging how concepts
and constructions of citizenship and identification were understood in this very
formative period in Lebanese history.Armenians in Lebanon within Armenian Historiography19
Since Salibi’s referenced Armenians a handful of times, and Traboulsi did not mention
them once, perhaps Armenians in Lebanon were located in another history, and not a
Lebanese one. If histories were organized on the basis of national grand narratives, then
Armenians in Lebanon should surely be mentioned in the first comprehensive history
of the Armenians, The Armenian People from Ancient to Modern Times, edited by Richard
G. Hovannisian. And yet, even though for Hovannisian “the history of the Armenian
people is long, complex, and in many ways epic and heroic,”20 Armenians in Lebanon
are only mentioned as refugees following the Armenian massacres in World War I and
who desired to return to a historic homeland. In their quest to write an epic history of
the Armenians, Hovannisian and the contributors accordingly did not consider whether
and how Armenians played a role in the formation of the history of Lebanon.
A more recent contribution to Armenian historiography is Razmik Panossian’s The
Armenians: From Kings and Priests to Merchants and Commissars, an examination of how
“Armenianness” was shaped by structural variables over time. While not a historian,
Panossian’s tracking of Armenianness materializes as an encompassing history of the
Armenian nation.21 Similar to Hovannisian’s volumes, The Armenians spans from “The
Beginning of Time” through to the independence of Soviet Armenia and its transition
into an independent republic.22 While Panossian does mention the Armenians in© 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd History Compass 11/10 (2013): 821–832, 10.1111/hic3.12092
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experiences and locations – as part of a larger Armenian “diasporic nation,” explaining
that “Armenianness” is “the most important category. . .created or reinforced in the
diaspora, superseding the differences within and between the communities.”23 Panossian
does not question the efficacy of “Armenianness” as an identification, and like the other
authors, fails to examine if Armenian inhabitants in Lebanon construct additional
histories, outside of the grand Armenian narrative. These narratives, which positioned
Armenians as members of a larger Armenian diaspora, concurrently endorsed the Soviet
Union’s interpretation of Armenian identification and belonging developed during the
repatriation movement of 1946–1949.The Additional Story
The 1946–1949 Soviet-engineered repatriation drive, (known as Nerkakht in Armenian)
was an organized attempt to “collect” all the Armenians located throughout the world
and “return” them to the “homeland” of the Soviet Republic of Armenia. Through
the official simultaneous radio broadcast on November 21, 1945 in Moscow, Yerevan,
London, Paris, and Beirut, both Soviet authorities and Armenians who supported the
movement designated the Soviet Republic of Armenia, one of the 15 republics of the
Soviet Union, as the homeland.24 The popularity of the repatriation movement makes
the phenomenon a particularly salient site for exploring the manufacturing processes
of a homeland.25 In addition, the success of repatriation contributes to our command
of the understandings of both citizenship and identification during this time.
Although this movement was celebrated in the Armenian (and Arabic) press in
Lebanon as both a homecoming and a reunification of the Armenian nation, it was also
a complex interplay of power by multiple state apparatuses – namely here the Lebanese
and the Soviet – that became intimately involved with this seeming Armenian project of
return.26 It is this state involvement that offers additional understandings of how the
Lebanese state articulated authority in the early years of the independent republic.
The Lebanese state regulated the reduction of its populace and accordingly defined a
section of its membership – those Armenians who wished to “repatriate” – as expend-
able. Though the Armenian act of “repatriation,” the Lebanese state redefining the
contours of its national membership. At the same time, as it reconfigured its own mem-
bers, the Lebanese state was also instrumental in constructing Soviet Armenian citizens.
In addition to exposing state power within what is traditionally seen as an Armenian
diasporic project, my aim is to likewise examine the adaptability of the identification of
Armenians in Lebanon during this time. The analysis of the variability in Armenian national
identification challenges conventional classifications of Armenians as a Diaspora and therefore
not involved in the fashioning of Lebanese history. In fact, the examination of the
repatriation process reveals the manufacturing process entailed with making Armenian
Lebanese citizens first into Diasporic Armenians and then into Soviet ones by various actors,
including the Lebanese government.
The first caravan (as it was referred to in the press) sailed from the port of Qarantina
in Beirut on June 23, carrying over 1500 Armenians. All in all, more than 100,000
heeded the call to “go home.” In Syria and Lebanon alone, over 30,000 Armenians
sailed from the port of Qarantina in Beirut. This, even though none of these passengers
were “from” the geographic boundary of Soviet Armenia.27 While homelands seldom
correspond to the geographic location of a person’s origins, and rather, manifest where
one imagines themselves to belong, this 1946 Armenian homeland was constructed by© 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd History Compass 11/10 (2013): 821–832, 10.1111/hic3.12092
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adopted by the Armenians of Lebanon.
While the repatriation announcement28 stated that Diasporic Armenians had
supported the project (and in fact it would be those Armenians who “realized” the
homeland by “returning”), it was the Soviet state that sanctioned, organized, and
“produced” the movement. Up until that point, the public dialog within the Armenian
press in Lebanon did not include the discourse of physically “returning home.” There
were discussions in the press calling for the creation of an Armenia in the geographic
lands of Anatolia (present day Turkey), but again, the concept of “returning,” and then
to Soviet Armenia was completely innovative. Once the Soviet government created the
homeland, it was then advertised as the fulfillment of the Armenian national project and
celebrated within the Lebanese (Armenian and Arabic) printed press. The actions of the
Soviet state encouraged Armenians to shift their identification to the USSR, connecting
their national struggle to the Soviet state. It is this shift that I consider a reinforcement
of Soviet state power and contestation to Lebanese state power. In the change from
being part of one state to becoming part of another, Armenians in Lebanon demonstrate
their agency in responding to both states’ powers. By examining how Armenians
engaged with both the Lebanese and Soviet governments, rather than assuming they
were foreign or irrelevant, we can investigate how their actions facilitated those of the
Lebanese state, which accordingly redefined the membership of its population.
The political channels at work to pull off this project entailed the cooperation on a
state level of various political authorities at the port of departure, arrival, and at sea, as
these ships made their way to the homeland. In Lebanon, not only did the Lebanese
government facilitate the arrival of the Soviet boat and its docking within its borders,
but it also processed the de-naturalization of the repatriates’ Lebanese citizenship.29
The Armenian repatriates had to be made into Soviet citizens in order for them to
“return home.” In affirming the Soviet construction of an Armenian homeland, the
Lebanese state positioned members of its own state as belonging to the USSR. The Leb-
anese state assisted in the loss of thousands of its citizens, while engineering the growth
of the Soviet Union.
The act of relinquishing Lebanese citizenship simultaneously legitimized the authority
of that nation-state. Armenians recognized Lebanese state authority in seeking to leave
Lebanon. In addition, the Lebanese government consolidated its power over the
remaining population. And at the same time, by consenting to Soviet citizenship, both
the repatriates and the Lebanese government recognized, reinforced, and expanded the
authority of the Soviet state. But that’s not all that’s happening: The desire and the
action of changing citizenship challenge the authority of a given nation-state. In other
words, the act of becoming another nation-state’s citizen subverts the authority of
citizenship, a classification employed by state power to categorize its inhabitants. The
ease and immediacy with which Armenians should switch citizenship show how state
categorizations were not fixed. Moreover, the state allowed Armenians to renounce
their citizenship and take another – even when this functioned at its own expense.
Without any real debate, Lebanese newspapers produced competing images of the Armenian
homeland, even if the papers did not question the locus of the Armenian homeland as constructed
by the Soviet and Lebanese states and maintained by the repatriates.30 In the concluding section
below, I want to explore the coverage of the departure of the first caravan by one of
the Lebanese-Armenian newspapers, Aztarar (Monitor), a weekly newspaper sympathetic to the
Armenian nationalist Dashnak party. Its varying representations indicated shifting identifications,
signaling their adaptability.© 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd History Compass 11/10 (2013): 821–832, 10.1111/hic3.12092
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repatriation.31 On the day after the first caravan sailed, below the headline “Bon Voyage
to the departing, may those remaining soon join [you]!” Aztarar displayed two large
photographs above and below each other.32 The top one, the transport ship the
Transylvania, showed the joyful repatriates wishing Lebanon and their families
farewell.33 The one below was also of jubilant crowds, but of those gathered at the port
wishing the departed well.34 Aztarar goes on to describe the actual departure of the first
caravan, signaling what it identifies as the beginning of the end to the Armenian
diasporic condition35:
At three o’clock, the ship finally sailed. With everyone’s eyes filled with tears and their hands
waving handkerchiefs, suddenly, and in the midst of shouts of jubilance and cheer, a chorus of
song was heard from aboard the ship. It was an over-one-thousand-person choir. The
departing--the old, the young, women, men--all of them individually and collectively were
singing the anthem of the Lebanese independent republic. Back at the dock, hundreds of peo-
ple along with many policemen, stood at attention, totally stunned. It is impossible to describe
their emotion and their joyous applause that followed.36
The national anthem of Lebanon was used to begin the journey to the Armenian
homeland. While “impromptu” singing could be interpreted as the repatriates’ final
act as former Lebanese citizens and performed out of respect for their hosts, I would like
to submit an additional reading of the event and its description provided by Aztarar.
The entire movement was filled with hybrid national representations: the boat being
of German origin, and made Soviet, it being led by a Soviet captain and crew, the name
of the ship referring to a central region in Romania. In fact, in order to solve the
diasporic condition of Armenians, the homeland was made by non-Armenians. Even
in the singing of the Lebanese national anthem when leaving Lebanon, which could
be seen as the new nation’s first public communiqué, fused representations emerge.
Their first public act as new Soviet compatriots who were “reuniting” with their
brothers and sisters in the homeland (through the help of their brothers and sisters in
the diaspora and the states of Lebanon and the USSR) was to sing an ode to the inde-
pendent Lebanese republic. This caused an emotional reaction not only from all those
on that boat, but also from the Lebanese citizens (Armenian and non-Armenian) who
were left at the dock. Was this act of singing the manifestation of combined national
identifications that subvert the homogenizing power of the state, even as state powers
(the Soviet and the Lebanese) ensure the success of this popular repatriation project?
Aztarar’s account of the singing was then followed by an analysis of the scene
involving the question “When did they learn this anthem and how?”37 The paper went
on to answer “Part of the group knew the anthem already, but the remainder had
studied it in Damascus and Beirut.”38 While Aztarar expressed discomfort regarding a
display of Lebanese patriotism, which might be seen as an affront to the repatriation
narrative, I argue it is precisely a moment of Armenians in Lebanon exhibiting a flexi-
bility of national identifications. And yet, such manifestations have long been ignored
within both the earlier histories of Lebanon and more recent contributions that go
beyond their initial limitations.
Repatriation coverage in Lebanon represents untapped resources that complicate both
traditional and corrective narratives of the history of Lebanon. This article demonstrates
how Armenians and non-Armenians, along with the Lebanese and Soviet governments,
constructed the homeland of Armenians in Lebanon – forcing a reevaluation of an© 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd History Compass 11/10 (2013): 821–832, 10.1111/hic3.12092
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constructed categories of their homeland, nation, and national belonging. In considering
Armenian inhabitants in Lebanon, only to ascribe them to another space beyond the
border, necessitates neglecting compound affiliations and the actions of the Lebanese
and Soviet governments in shaping each other’s national membership. These readings,
along with ignoring the actions of Armenian inhabitants completely, restrict Lebanese
historiography, preventing the field from challenging the overused framework of
Lebanon’s abnormality. A critical reconceptualization of such events as the repatriation
narrative changes – and challenges – how we study Armenians, Armenians in
Lebanon, and Lebanese.
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22 Panossian, The Armenians, vii.
23 Panossian, The Armenians, 292. (Original emphasis.)
24 The Council of People’s Commissars was the highest government authority in the Soviet Union until 1946 when it
was replaced by the Council of Ministers of the USSR. “Nergaght’e”, Nor Oughi (Beirut), 5(9) 1946, 231.
25 All Armenian press outlets worldwide, regardless of political persuasion and religious denomination, avidly welcomed
and celebrated the endeavor.
26 The Armenian repatriation movement was not the only organized mass population transfer between nation-states
taking place during this period. The Zionist project in Palestine and the movement to partition India into two states,
India and Pakistan, were gaining in popularity and momentum. Like other “repatriations,” the Armenian worldwide
population did not, and could not, trace its roots – whether real or imaginary – to the Soviet Republic of Armenia.
27 These passengers – until the moment they stepped upon the ship – were either Lebanese or Syrian citizens, and had
been so since the French mandate powers had extended citizenship to Armenian refugees in 1924. This extension was© 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd History Compass 11/10 (2013): 821–832, 10.1111/hic3.12092
830 Beyond Overlooked Populations in Lebanese Historiographythereafter guaranteed by the independent states of Syria and Lebanon. The great majority of the Armenian population of
Syria and Lebanon had arrived as refugees from the Ottoman Empire, areas that had become part of the Republic of
Turkey since 1923. I maintain that the success of this movement would be peculiar even if the 100,000 returnees could
trace their roots to the geographic areas of Soviet Armenia. Nevertheless, why I categorize the movement here to be
peculiar is because it was engineered as a repatriation or return and was successful as such – even though no one involved
in the process would have been able to justify the movement of thousands as a “return.”
28 ’Nergaght e’, Nor Oughi, 231.
29 I use the word de-naturalization purposefully, as it suggests that this process was not natural. It wasn’t. It was due to
the engineering of nation-states, such as the USSR and Lebanon, which, because of their approval of this population
transfer, pushed for the resolution of the Armenian diasporic condition.
30 In the first year of repatriation (1946), none of the Armenian press outlets in Lebanon spoke against the movement.
While it is true that Aztag (Power/Factor), the daily associated with the nationalist Dashnak party did engage in disputes
with rival party newspapers at the time, including Ararad and Zartonk, none of the outlets specifically engaged with the
ideology of repatriation. Rather, these clashes centered around contesting the reported statements made by resigning
members of the Dashnak political party and its affiliated organizations (which was a requirement demanded by Soviet
authorities to all those repatriating). This situation changed relatively quickly in that by 1947, Dashnak party affiliated
newspapers, especially Aztag, did not dedicate as much space to the events surrounding repatriation. Still, all outlets
continued to at least follow the population transfer, and it was not until the movement neared its end, in 1949, that
Aztag became heavily critical. In addition, it should be noted that other newspapers sympathetic to the Dashnak party,
such as Aztarar continued to follow repatriation with relatively consistent interest. By the early 1950s however, most – if
not all – of the Dashnak associated newspapers avidly spoke against the movement, the Soviet State of Armenia, the
USSR, Zartonk, Ararad, and its associated parties. Most contemporary Armenian historiographies, including Migliorino,
(Re)Constructing Armenia, do not detail these changes, maintaining that the Dashnak party was always against repatriation.
31 All Armenian newspapers in Lebanon, to varying degrees, supported the repatriation movement, some more ambivalent
than others. Without explicitly labeling Soviet Armenia as the homeland of the Armenians, Aztag, the Armenian daily of
the Armenian nationalist Dashnak party, still identified the place that these travelers were moving to as the homeland. It also
tacitly supported the process by connecting the emotion at separating from their families and history in Lebanon to the imag-
ined exhilaration felt at reuniting with the homeland. See for example, ’Nergaght’i Arajin Karawane’, Aztag (Beirut), 25 June
1946, sec 1: 1. In their offers of well wishes, however, it is unclear if Aztag identified those leaving as “compatriots”with those
who remain. Are these repatriates compatriots because they share the same “tears-worth of memories” in Lebanon as Lebanese,
or as Armenians, or both? If Armenians in Lebanon identified themselves as Lebanese and Armenian, could that challenge the
Soviet state’s construction of the Armenian homeland in the USSR and the “reunification” of the Armenian diaspora
supported by the Lebanese state, and its Arabic and Armenian press?
32 ’Bari Chanaparh Hayrenik’ Meknoghnerun’, Aztarar (Beirut), 29 June 1946, sec 1: 1.
33 This is in marked contrast to Aztag, the daily of the Armenian nationalist Dashnak party, which did not call for all
Armenians in Lebanon to repatriate and which mentioned the pain of separation alongside the joy of return. In fact,
in the same week that Aztarar ran this headline, Aztag ran a declaration on its front page by the highest figure of the
Armenian church in Lebanon that stated “It is the natural duty of the Armenians of the Diaspora to help their brothers
and sisters, no matter how minor the assistance, to defray the enormous costs of repatriation proportionally.”
(Vehap’ar’in Koch’e’ Aztag (Beirut), 26 June 1946 sec 1: 1.) This declaration encouraged Armenians in Lebanon to
support repatriation without repatriating themselves. While this is a pragmatic response to the popularity of the project,
all Armenians did not define themselves as belonging to the USSR, opting to remain in Lebanon. This remaining
population secured the place of Armenians within Lebanese history, and yet is not present in its historiography. After
all, the Armenians who stayed behind reinforced their status as Lebanese citizens as they were given the opportunity
by both governments to “repatriate” and chose not to.
34 ’Bari Chanaparh’, Aztarar, 1.
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